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THE CORPORATE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS: A RESOLUTION AND REVISION
Jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states was vested
in the federal courts by Congress in 1789.' Until :958, however, the statutory
language was silent as to corporations; they were woven into the diversity pat-
tern by a judicial fiction that made them citizens of their states of incorpora-
tion. In 1958, desire to reduce the mounting backlog of federal cases and
dissatisfaction with the fiction that allowed a local corporation to enter federal
courts merely because it had a foreign charter led to the enactment of section
1332(c) of the Judicial Code. Corporate citizenship was extended to the state in
which the corporation has its principal place of business as well as its states of
incorporation. The term principal place of business introduced complications
not envisioned by Congress.
"Principal Place of Business"
The corporation's berth in the diversity structure was first before the Supreme
Court in 18o9.2 The Court held that corporations, though not citizens, could sue
and be sued, diversity jurisdiction being dependent on the citizenship of their
stockholders. The complete diversity doctrine3 precluded corporate use of the
federal courts unless all shareholders had citizenship diverse from all adversar-
ies.4 Because of the growth of the economic importance of corporations, and the
disaffection with the effect of the complete diversity doctrine, the Supreme
Court in 1844 held that corporations would be "deemed" citizens of their state
of incorporation.5 To avoid calling corporations citizens, the Court later con-
%. Judiciary Act of 1789 § %%, r Stat. 78.
2. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (18o9). The Constitution
and the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not mention corporations. Apparently prior to %8o9 they
were sued without jurisdictional problems. Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, and
Possessors of Liberty, 94 U. Pa. L. Rev. 202, 211 (1946); Warren, Corporations and Diversity
of Citizenship, 19 Va. L. Rev. 661, 662-63 (1933).
3. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (18o6).
4. See, e.g., Commercial & R.R. Bank v. Slocomb, Richards, & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 6o
(1840); Sullivan v. Fulton Steam Boat Co., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 450 (1821). The Court has
distinguished corporations having national charters. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). Diversity exists when the branch of the national corporation in-
volved is located in another state. Ex parte Jones, 164 U.S. 691 (1897). See 28 U.S.C. § 1348
(%964)-
5. Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844). This step has been criti-
cized. McGovney, A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 874 (%943).
May 1966 Vol. 34 No. 4
The Corporate Principal Place of Business
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
dusively presumed the stockholders to be citizens of the incorporating state,0
and subsequent cases made contrary averments inadmissible. 7
This insistence on looking to the natural persons composing corporations to
determine corporate citizenship and the refusal to recognize their actual citizen-
ship soon led to conceptual difficulties. Remedies, such as Equity Rule 948 and
the "forum doctrine,"9 were unsuccessful, and an anomaly thus developed per-
mitting a local corporation to invoke diversity jurisdiction in litigation with
local parties merely by incorporating in another state."
The expansion of state jurisdictional statutes and the "corporate presence"
doctrine" broadened the field of operation of the fictional presumption of stock-
holder citizenship, 12 and federal dockets became congested with diversity
6. Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (6 How.) 314 (1854). A similar presumption
has been applied to foreign corporations, Ferrigno v. Ocean Transp., Ltd., %88 F. Supp. 179
(S.D.N.Y. 196o), rev'd on other grounds, 3o9 F.zd 445 (2d Cir. 1962), but not to unincor-
porated associations. United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145(1965).
7. See, e.g., St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, %6% U.S. 545 (1896); Covington Drawbridge Co.
v. Shepherd, 6% U.S. (2o How.) 227, 233 (%857).
8. %04 U.S. IX (%882). A stockholder sued his own corporation alleging his home citizen-
ship as diverse from that of the corporation while, at the same time, he was presumed a
citizen of the corporation's home state. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (%8 How.) 331 (1856).
Corporations then refused to enforce their legal rights; stockholders from foreign states were
selected to sue the directors and the other party, joining the suit in equity obtaining stand-
ing in the federal diversity courts otherwise not available. Equity Rule 94 was intended to
restrict this collusive use of the federal courts. The rule, however, was ineffective absent proof
of collusion. Greenwood v. Freight Co., %o5 U.S. 13 (%88z).
9. Corporations incorporated in more than one state posed a dilemma. Natural persons
could not be presumed to be citizens of more than one state simultaneously. The problem
was resolved in favor of the "forum doctrine" which may be illustrated as follows: Assume
a corporation is incorporated in states A and B and is sued by a citizen of A. If the suit is in
a federal court of A, there is no diversity. See, e.g., Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
206 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. %953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (%954). If the suit is in a federal
court of B, diversity exists as the corporation's charter in A is not considered. Boston &
Maine R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d 749 (ist Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297 U.S. 7:E5 (1936). If the
suit is in a federal court of state C, diversity does not exist since all the states of incorpora-
tion are then considered. Waller v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 127 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); 3 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 98 (1955). But see Gavin v. Hudson & M.R.R., 185 F.2d 104 (3 d Cir.
x95o). See generally Weckstein, Multi-State Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship: A
Field Day For Fictions, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. 195 (1964).
1o. The most spectacular case was Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 5%8 (1928), noted 27 Mich. L. Rev. 2%2 (1928).
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), removed the incentive to reincorporate to take
advantage of federal common law but did not cure the anomaly.
ii. While it had been established that a corporation might sue in other states, Bank of
Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839), it was presumed that personal service on a
corporate agent outside the state of incorporation was insufficient because it had no legal
existence there. In %856, the Supreme Court upheld such jurisdiction in state courts, Lafayette
Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856), and in 1877 overruled the federal court's
refusal to do so. Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369 (1877). The doctrine has subsequently
been extended, McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957), and refined. Hanson
v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
12. The Court still refused to confer "citizenship" on corporations. Some subsequent cases,
however, rested on the %844 Letson decision, 43 U.S. (z How.) 497 (i844)-not on the pre-
cases.' 8 In 1958, Congress responded to many calls for action' 4 and, believing
limitation of diversity jurisdiction the best overall corrective measure, extended
corporate citizenship to the state in which the corporation has its principal place
of business in addition to the state of incorporation. 15
The phrase "principal place of business" was drawn from the Bankruptcy
Act' 6 on the assumption that experience under that act would provide precedent
for application of the standard. This proved a naive hope, for the only agree-
ment among bankruptcy cases was that principal place of business is a ques-
tion of fact to be determined in light of all relevant evidence.' 7 More
specifically, the decisions applying section 1332(c) cluster around two distinct
tests: One looks to the corporate home office, considering location of managing
offices, meeting place of the stockholders, and location of the corporate records,
but not business volume in particular states.' 8 The other looks to the actual
place of operations, considering the bulk of corporate activity controlling and
weighing such elements as location of factories, business volume, and the
number of employees in each state.'9
This Note will compare these dichotomous tests, propose refinement of the
home office test, and suggest alternative legislative language.
sumption fiction of Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (E854). See
Railway Co. v. Whittson's Adm'r, 8o U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (-871). Practically, it makes little
difference which theory is applied. The treatises generally do not distinguish them. Ballantine,
Manual of Corporation Law and Practice 39 (193o); 8 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 4o3o
(rev. perm. ed. '1931).
13. See Note, New Federal Jurisdictional Statute Achieves Early Success in Reducing Num-
ber of District Court Case Filings But Presents Interpretative Difficulties, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
1287 (1958).
14. (1) To abolish diversity jurisdiction: S. 939, H.R. 11508, 7 2d Cong., %st Sess. (1932),
criticized in comment by members of the University of Chicago Law Faculty, Limiting Juris-
diction of the Federal Courts-Pending Bills, 31 Mich. L. Rev. 59 (%931); Howland, Shall
Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens of Different States Be Preserved?,
18 A.B.A.J. 499 (1932); Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, I8
A.B.A.J. 433 (1931). (z) To make a corporation a citizen of every state in which it does busi-
ness: E.g., H.R. 3092, H.R. 3969, 8 7 th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); H.R. 1987, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
(195i). (3) To limit diversity to natural persons: E.g., H.R. 2516, 85 th Cong., ist Sess. (%957).(4) To make corporations citizens of states in which they do business in all litigation arising
out of such business: S. 937, H.R. 10594, 7 2d Cong., 1st Sess. (%931); Warren, supra note 2;
Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 26 (1948); Yntema, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Controversies Between
Citizens of Different States, -9 A.B.A.J. 71, 149 (1933). (5) To make corporations citizens of
states where they are incorporated and have their principal place of business: Henderson,
The Position of Foreign Corporations in American Constitutional Law %91-93 (1918).
z. "For purposes of this section and section %44I of this title, a corporation shall be
deemed a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated and of the state where it has
its principal place of business." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964). The decision not to abolish diver-
sity jurisdiction was apparently based on the belief that local bias still exists. This question
has long been debated. See Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 3, 22-24 (%948); Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 4%
Harv. L. Rev. 483 (%928). For consideration of the effect of the amendment on the "forum
doctrine," see Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, ii Stan. L. Rev. 213, 225
(1959); Moore &r Weckstein, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction: A Su-
preme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 1426, 1433 (1964).
16. 66 Stat. 420, 11 U.S.C. § -=(a)(i) (-1964).
17. See, e.g., Carolina Motor Express Lines, Inc. v. Blue & White Serv., Inc., 192 F.2d 89
(7 th Cir. 1951); Bank of Commerce v. Carter, 61 F.zd 986 (8th Cir. 1932).
z8. See, e.g., Burdick v. Dillon, i44 Fed. 737 (@st Cir. 19o6), appeal dismissed, 205 U.S. 550
(1907); In re Pennsylvania Consol. Coal Co., 163 Fed. 579 (E.D. Pa. 19o8).
19. Continental Coal Corp. v. Roszelle Bros., 242 Fed. 243 (6th Cir. 1917).
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Home Office Versus Actual Place of Operations
The place of operations test attempts to identify the state in which the bulk of
corporate activity is conducted" on the theory that this is where the corpora-
tion's litigation most likely will arise and that diversity will therefore be dis-
solved more often, which result effectuates the primary congressional intent to
reduce the federal caseload.21 Further, it apparently eliminates the unfairness
resulting from a local corporation's use of diversity jurisdiction because it has a
foreign charter while an identical corporation with a local charter or a local citi-
zen is barred, thus fulfilling a secondary purpose of the amendment.'
This test, however, has serious difficulties. Collection and consideration of
pertinent evidence is burdensome.23 Further, there is a danger of reversal by an
appellate court attaching different weight to such factors as volume of produc-
tion and sales at each place of operations 24 than did the trial court. Moreover,
the party alleging diversity must establish it by a preponderance of the evi-
dence,2" and the question may not be stipulated or waived.26 This task, compli-
cated enough for the plaintiff corporation, may prove insuperable for the indi-
vidual plaintiff seeking to sue the corporation in a federal court. Although
federal discovery procedures 27 will compel disclosure of the corporate records,
the individual may find such materials voluminous and unintelligible. 28 The
obstructions to finding an actual place of operations from a surfeit of unfamiliar
payroll accounts, production records, and inventories leave the non-corporate
litigant at a dear disadvantage. 29
The fundamental objection to the place of operations test, however, arises
when it is applied to large corporations operating in several states, for it may
serve as no more than a facade for an arbitrary decision. A court cannot mean-
ingfully compare, for example, a smelter in one state with an ore pit in another.
The court must endeavor to select a factor or combination of factors that it
deems point to one state.30 An arbitrary result is avoided only when the corpor-
ation's activities are concentrated in one state; the wider the spread of corporate
activity, the more voluminous and possibly unrelated the data to be weighed.
Absent a common denominator, what is announced as a precise formula is,
2o. For a full description see Moore & Weckstein, supra note I5, at %438-45; Scott, The
Dual Citizenship of Corporations, and Their Principal Place of Business, 23 Fed. B.J. 1o3, 1%6-
19 (1963); Note, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 308, 316-24 (1959).
21. Scott, supra note 20, at 117; Note, supra note 20, at 320.
22. S. Rep. No. 183o, 8 5 th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958). [Hereinafter cited as Senate.]
23. See Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.zd 850, 853-54 (3d Cir. 196o).
24. Meek v. City of Sacramento, 132 F. Supp. 546 (N.D. Cal. 1955) (presumption of lack of
jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings); Note, 46 Calif. L. Rev. 831, 834 (1958).
25. McNut v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
26. Ibid.; Barkhom v. Adlib Associates, Inc., 345 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1965); Undenvood v.
Maloney, 256 F.2d 334,340 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 864 (1958); Spencer v. Patey, 243
Fed. 555, 556 (2d Cir. 1917).
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
28. See Note, supra note 2o, at 322.
29. Scott, supra note 2o, at 1%-i3; Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 391, 394 (%958).
3o. Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.zd 85o, 853 (3 d Cir. 196o).
in fact, mere guesswork. It seems incongruous to demand delay-producing
analysis8' of an issue unrelated to the substantive questions of the case when
the express purpose of the act was to dear congested dockets. 2
The home office test8s avoids these problems since fixing its location is gen-
erally a simple task. In Scott Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 4 the court
found that, since defendant's executive offices and promotional and adminis-
trative activities were in New York and that basic policy decisions were made
there, its home office was New York. Facts that will establish the home office
often are a matter of public record; the court is not forced into arbitrary deci-
sions. Moreover, the nerve center of a corporation generally will be in the same
state as its operations. s5 Being manifestly simple and quick, the home office
test is more responsive to the principal goal of Congress-reducing the backlog
of cases."8
It has been suggested, however, that since the home office and the bulk of
corporate activity will not always coincide, the home office test will neither
produce the maximum reduction in diversity litigation37 nor cure the anomaly
of the local corporation using the federal courts to the exclusion of other local
parties who do not have a foreign home office. 8 To examine these propositions,
the cases should be classified according to corporate patterns: (i) the home
office and the bulk of corporate activity are in the same state; (2) the home
office is in one state and the bulk of corporate activity in another; (3) the home
office is in one state and the corporation carries on substantial business in that
state and numerous other states.
Applied to pattern one, the tests are equally effective because they place cor-
porate citizenship in the same state. Under pattern two, most corporate litiga-
tion will presumably arise in the state of maximum corporate activity with
citizens of that state. Thus, the place of operations test would destroy diversity
in more cases than would the home office test. But, in reality, pattern two would
rarely arise. Thus, the failure of the home office test to meet this problem should
not militate against its adoption in light of the simplicity of its application.
Nevertheless, the home office test has been criticized for preserving the
anomaly of the local corporation gaining access to the federal courts merely be-
cause it has a foreign charter-the anomaly Congress hoped to eradicate
with the amendment."' The test will allow some local corporations to invoke
diversity jursidiction merely because they have foreign home offices while sim-
ilar local corporations with local home offices will be barred. Because Congress
spoke only of the local corporation with a foreign charter-not a foreign home
3-1. Note, supra note 29, at 393; Note, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 637, 645 (1958); Note, 6 Utah L..
Rev. 231, 243 (%958). See Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 95 (1957) (eight years spent deter-
mining the issue of jurisdiction).
32. Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 85 thCong., ist Sess., ser. 5, at iii (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1957 Hearings]; Note, supra note 24,
at 833-34; Note, 6 Utah L. Rev. 231 (1958).
33. For a full description, see Scott, supra note 2o, at 16-19; Note, supra note 2o, at 3%6-x7.
34. 170 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
35. Eldridge v. Richfield Oil Corp., 247 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Cal. 1965); Inland Rubber Corp.
v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Moesser v. Crucible Steel Co.
of America, %73 F. Supp. 953 (W.D. Pa. -959).
36. See Senate at 5.
37. Note, supra note 20, at 320.
38. Note, supra note 29, at 394.
39. See Senate at 4.
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office-the home office test actually creates a new anomaly. The "old" anomaly
falls within pattern one; the home office test is as effective as the place of oper-
ations test in obviating it. The "new" anomaly falls within pattern two, a
matter on which Congress expressed no intent.40
Again, this new anomaly is not so serious that courts should venture into the
place of operations quagmire to cure it.41 Because of the inconvenience of main-
taining management and business activity in different states for relatively
small corporations, the new anomaly likely will be an exceptional case rather
than the rule.
The number of corporations gaining access to federal courts via this pattern
could be further reduced by defining the home office as the place where day-to-
day control of the business is exercised. Such a test should rule out the locations
of stockholder and director meetings. For large corporations, it would be the
site of the executive offices; for others, it might be that of the office of the gen-
eral manager or the superintendent. In Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire
Service, Inc.,4 in which the directors and officers met in one state while the
managers in charge of corporate operations were in another, the home office
would be deemed to be the manager's location, the same state the court identi-
fied as the principal place of business using the place of operations test.
Pattern three-the corporation doing substantial business in several states-
presents different considerations. As noted by Judge Goodrich, the difficulty
lies in attempting to pinpoint the principal place of business of a corporation
such as United States Steel Corporation:43
This great corporation has fourteen divisions of the parent corporation
and eleven principal subordinate companies. Its various manufacturing
activities are spread over practically all the United States and extend to foreign
countries. It has literally dozens of important places of business one of which
we must pick out as the principal one because the statute says so.
The complications of the place of operations test reach their apogee in pattern
three. Accordingly, as more unrelated factors are placed on the scales, the bal-
ance tips heavily toward the possibility of arbitrary decisions. 44
The place of operations test might name any one of the states in which the
corporation does substantial business as the principal place of business. Yet, lit-
igation may arise in any of them, and the aggregate activity in the remaining
40. The courts have strictly interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1332(C) (1964) in terms of the express
Congressional intent. United Steelworkers of America v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145
(1965), criticized in 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 793 (%966) (refusal to apply § 1332(c) to an unin-
corporated association with all the characteristics of a corporation); Tsakonites v. Transpacific
Carriers Corp., 246 F. Supp. 634, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (refusal to apply § 1332(c) to a corpora-
tion with an alien charter whose principal place of business was New York); Chemical Transp.
Corp. v. Chemical Petroleum Corp., 246 F. Supp. 563, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (refusal to apply
§ %332(c) to a corporation with an alien charter).
41. See text at notes 20-32 supra.
42. 22o F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
43. Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 85o, 853 (3 d Cir. 196o).
44. See text at notes 3o-3% supra.
states may well exceed that of the place of operations. But the court can find
only one principal place of business, and other courts usually will abide by that
determination in subsequent litigation.45 Thus, the place of operations test will
allow corporations to invoke diversity in states in which they do substantial
business. 40
The result under the home office test will be the same. Section 1332(c), how-
ever, was not directed at large multi-state operators.4 7 The original proposal
would have made corporations citizens of the state from which they derived
over one-half their gross income.48 This scheme would not have reached large
corporations deriving their income from many states. Congress discarded this
proposal-not because of dislike for this exemption-but only because it
thought the bankruptcy precedents would prove more useful.
When the inadequacies and complexities of the place of operations test are
compared with the simplicity of the home office test in light of this congres-
sional intent, the latter seems more consonant with the purposes of the
amendment.
Judicial Application of the Amendment
A particular court's choice of the home office or the place of operations test gen-
erally has turned on the type of corporation first confronting it with the issue.
Thus, if the corporation has its home office in one state and its bulk of activity
in another, courts have applied the actual place of operations test.49 If the cor-
poration is diversified and does roughly equal amounts of business in several
states, the home office test has been applied."0
Drawing on these alternative approaches, the literature has suggested that
courts adopt a less rigid stand on either test. The courts could apply either test
depending on the corporate structure before them in each case."'
Finally, it has been suggested that the two tests be combined, including the
location of the home office along with the considerations of the actual place of
operations test.52 This approach supposedly will place corporate citizenship in
the state bearing the corporation's greatest impact."
45. See Woods v. United Air Lines, Inc., 2%6 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. %963).
46. Eagan v. American Airlines, Inc., 324 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. %963).
47. "[The amendment] will eliminate those corporations doing a local business with a for-
eign charter but will not eliminate those corporations which do business over a large number
of States .... Even such a corporation, however, would be regarded as a citizen of that one of
the States in which was located its principal place of business." Senate at 5. (Emphasis added.)
48. Senate at 30-31; 1957 Hearings 36.
49. Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire Serv., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. %963).
50. Sabo v. Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 893 (7 th Cir. 1961); Lancer Indus., Inc. v. American
Ins. Co., -197 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. La. i961); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., z70 F.
Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
.z. Pugh, Federal Jurisdiction and Practice, 36 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 142, 147 (1961); 40 N.C.L.
Rev. %22, 130-31 (1961).
52. Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 85o (3d Cir. %96o). Although Kelly is sub-ject to differing interpretations, compare Textron Electronics, Inc. v. Unholtz-Dickie Corp.,
193 F. Supp. 456 (D. Conn. 196%) with United Indus. Corp. v. Gira, 204 F. Supp. 410 (D. Del.
1961), many courts have adopted its approach of weighing factors from both tests. See, e.g.,
Bullock v. Wiebe Constr. Co., 24% F. Supp. 961 (D. Iowa %965); F]amen v. Coastal Tank Lines,
Inc., 195 P. Supp. 777 (W.D. Pa. %961); Gilardi v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry., 189 F. Supp. 82
(N.D. IIl. 196o); Bryfogle v. Acme rikt, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. %959).
53. See Note, supra note 29.
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All these approaches, however, suffer from difficulties. Although it is simple
to distinguish between extreme examples of local corporations and multi-state
operators (the local grocery store vis-h-vis General Electric), the determination
becomes difficult between these poles; a determination of the amount of multi-
state activity in which a local corporation engages merely adds a new dimen-
sion to an already complex question. First, the court must determine which test
should apply. Then if it concludes the place of operations test will be adminis-
tered, the court is still faced with the vagaries of its application. The approach
confronts the court with a dual possibility of reversal. It may err in designat-
ing the type of corporation or in applying the relevant test.
A more promising tool of judicial repair lies in interpreting section 1332(c)
to create more than one principal place of business; corporations would
then be citizens of states in which they did substantial business. This interpreta-
tion would be internally consistent since section 1332(c) has been interpreted
as making corporations citizens of each state in which they are incorporated.5
It would be a small step to apply a plural interpretation to principal place of
business; this construction would require "the" to be interpreted as "a". 55 The
problems of weighing unrelated factors from different states would be elimi-
nated; each state in which there was activity would be an independent principal
place of business. The volume of diversity litigation would be reduced, and the
anomaly of the local corporation gaining access to the federal courts to the ex-
clusion of other local parties would be obviated.
This interpretation, however, conflicts with an express congressional intent
to make the principal place of business singular.56 Such an interpretation was
suggested to Congress before enactment of the 1958 amendment in the extreme
form of making corporations citizens of states in which they were "doing bus-
iness"--rather than substantial business-and was rejected. Not only would
these multiple place of business interpretations effectively dose the doors of
federal courts to large multi-state corporations, they would also raise interpre-
tative problems. Setting an arbitrary limit on "substantial" business or "doing
business" may leave the courts in the same quandary of determining, for ex-
ample, the monetary value of a warehouse or mine in the various states of cor-
porate activity. Thus, the efficacy of this solution is seriously diminished by
the problems it engenders.
A Legislative Proposal
Faced with weaknesses inherent in both the home office and the actual place of
operations test, and judicial refusal to go beyond the letter of the 1958
54. Evans-Hailey Co. v. Crane Co., 207 P. Supp. %93, 201 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Stroup v.
Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R., 186 P. Supp. 154 (N.D. Ohio 196o); Weckstein, Multi-State Cor-
porations and Diversity of Citizenship: A Field Day for Fictions, 31 Tenn. L. Rev. x95, 2o-16
(1964).
55. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(C) (1964).
56. Senate at 5.
57. H.R. 1987, Sd Cong., %st Sess. (%95%).
amendment,"6 the remaining path for change is legislative action. Many of the
problems of the amendment result from the requirement that there be only one
principal place of business, Congress believing out-of-state corporations still
needed protection from local prejudice against foreign citizens.59
Local prejudice against foreign citizens-not prejudice against corporations,
unions, or racial and religious groups in general which exists independent of
citizenship-if ever bona fide,60 has been vitiated as a rationale.6 Federal
courts draw juries from the same sources as state courts62 and, since Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 3 are to apply the same substantive law. In conjunction with the
cosmopolitanism of an increasingly transient population, these considerations
make it difficult to give credence to fears of local prejudice based on diverse cit-
izenship.6 4 Any prejudice against corporations stems from their size, wealth
and impersonal nature-not their foreign citizenship 5 The handicap, there-
fore, is present in both state and federal courts.
Convincing statistics argue that instead of fear of local prejudice, litigants
are motivated to enter federal courts by such factors as convenient location, the
federal right to jury trial, the superiority of federal procedure, and the real or
imagined superiority of federal judges and juries.6 Since convenience, rather
than prejudice, is dominant, entry to the federal courts assumes the character
of a privilege rather than a protectory device; and fairness dictates that all liti-
gants, corporations and individuals, should be placed on an equal footing in
enjoying this privilege. 67 Furtherance of equality, therefore, rather than protec-
tion against prejudice should be central to a revision of section 1332(c). Accord-
ingly, the requirement responsible for many of the problems and which mili-
tates against equal treatment-the requirement of one principal place of
58. See note 40 supra.
59. Senate at 4-5; 1957 Hearings %%-%4.
6o. See generally Friendly, supra note 15.
61. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). See also Jackson, The Supreme Court and the American System of Government 37
(1955); Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 28 111. L. Rev. 356, 36o (1933); Sum-
mers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 Iowa L. Rev.
933 (%962); Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 Va. L. Rev. 66z,
684-85 (%933). This position is not inconsistent with United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 150 (1965), where the Court recognized the existence
of anti-union bias in a particular town. This bias, prejudice against labor unions because they
are labor unions, is distinct from the bias which is the historic underpinning of diversity juris-
diction-prejudice against foreign citizens solely because they are foreign citizens. This latter
prejudice is also distinguishable from racial bias, which exists against all members of the
particular race irrespective of their citizenship. It is this prejudice against members of a class
regardless of citizenship to which the Supreme Court has shown sensitivity. See Bouligny
supra; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 38o U.S. 479 (1965) (by implication).
62. Ball, supra note 61, at 361.
63. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
64. Wright, Federal Courts 67 (1963). Contra, Note, 53 Nw. U. L. Rev. 637, 643-44 (1958);
Comment, 62 W. Va. L. Rev. 405 (196o).
65. Ball, supra note 61, at 361.
66. See generally Summers, supra note 61.
67. Although the historic justification for it is invalid, this note assumes the desirability
of retaining diversity jurisdiction. This question has been debated and adequate treatment
would require great length. It should suffice, however, to say the assumption is supported by
convincing reasons. See Wright, supra note 64, at 67-69; Frank, For Maintaining Diversity
Jurisdiction, 73 Yale L.J. 7 (1963); Phillips & Christenson, The Historical and Legal Back-
ground of the Diversity Jurisdiction, 46 A.B.A.J. 959, 962-63 (196o).
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business although a corporation may have many significant places of busi-
ness 6 -- should be abolished.
With this background, section 1332(c) should be amended to read as follows:
For purposes of this section and section z44-1 of this title, a corporation
shall be deemed a citizen of the state in which control of the corporate act or
omission out of which the litigation arose is exercised in the normal course of
business.
Some examples illustrate the operation of this proposal: United States Steel
operates a mill in Provo, Utah. A truck dispatched from the mill hits a Utah
citizen on a Utah road. The Third Circuit, using a variant of the place of op-
erations test, has placed U.S. Steel's principal place of business in Pennsyl-
vania.69 The home office test would locate it in New York.70 The proposal,
however, would place U.S. Steel's citizenship, for purposes of this litigation,
in Utah because control over the truckdriver was exercised there in the ordinary
course of business.
This approach would ignore the Utah mill's "organization chart" connection
to U.S. Steel's headquarters and accord it the same treatment as the local busi-
nesses which in fact it resembles. The only distinction between the branch and
the local business is the ultimate authority exercised by an out-of-state office.
The activity resulting in the litigation was indigenous to the branch's locality;
it is anomalous to link it to a foreign state simply because the parent's princi-
pal place of business is there.
A truck is dispatched from the Utah mill and strikes a California citizen in
California. U.S. Steel's citizenship under the proposed legislation would be in
Utah although U.S. Steel does substantial business in California. The proposed
test would concentrate on control of the litigation causing activity-not vol-
ume of business. This results in placing corporations on a parity with natural
citizens and purely local corporations. If a corporation were considered a citi-
zen of every state in which it did substantial business or just did business, large
multi-state corporations would be effectively excluded from the federal courts
and the objective of fair and equal treatment would not be met.
The result would be the same if the truck from the Utah mill struck a truck
dispatched from Litton Industries in California even though Litton does sub-
stantial business in Utah and U.S. Steel does substantial business in Califor-
nia-the Litton and U.S. Steel branches are treated as individual citizens car-
rying on activities in foreign states. For if a Utah citizen who owned property
in California struck a California citizen who owned property in Utah, diversity
would exist.
The proposed legislation is well suited for tort law because it focuses on con-
trol of an act or omission; the parties involved and the time and place of a
68. Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 853 (3d Cir. %96o).
69. id. at 854.
70. Id. at 853-54.
tortious act are usually readily identifiable. However, contracts or cases involv-
ing both tort and contract require identification of the site of such elusive events
as offer, acceptance, and breach.
But the proposal will apply equally well if it is understood that the "control"
of the proposal is not the control concept of agency. The touchstone is control
in the ordinary course of business; the design is to place citizenship in the state
or states in which normal operating control over the activity resulting in the
breach is exercised. This circumvents agency questions of who had control in
specific cases, and instead asks who normally has control in the majority of
cases. In the normal course of business, the management of the branch is re-
sponsible for its own operations; control over a contract default likely will be
exercised there.
Again, most cases should offer few problems. Examples will illustrate the
solution of apparently difficult cases: A Utah citizen, insured by a Texas in-
surance company, is struck in Utah by the Utah steel mill's truck. The victim
settles with the Texas company, which is subrogated to his rights as insured.
In jurisdictions regarding the subrogee as standing in the shoes of the
insured, 71 the insurance company's citizenship will be identical to the insured's.
In jurisdictions treating the insurance company as the real party in interest,7"
the company's citizenship will be in the state containing the nearest claims ad-
juster. In most cases, the result will be the same, for most large companies
have claim agents in every state. These agents are responsible for claims in
their area resulting from both permanent and transient citizens. The outcome
would be the same in states having direct action statutes in which the insurer
is sued directly as the real party in interest; the insurer is a citizen of the state
in which control over the litigation producing activity is exercised. This result
is identical to that of the 1958 amendment.7 8
A construction company negotiates a contract with U.S. Steel for delivery of
steel from the Utah mill at a Utah damsite. The mill defaults, and a contract
action is brought in Utah. Since the omission causing the litigation occurred in
Utah, U.S. Steel's citizenship will be in Utah for that litigation. The Utah mill
should be precluded from pleading that it did not negotiate the contract or that
the home office caused the breach. The test looks to control as it is exercised
year in and year out. Once it is established that the branch had acted on, or re-
ceived notice of, the contract, special circumstances causing the breach that orig-
inate elsewhere will not remove the corporation's citizenship to another state.
The construction company negotiates a contract with U.S. Steel at its home
office in New York for delivery at the Utah damsite. The time of breach will be
determinative of citizenship. If the breach occurs after the Utah branch or any
other branch has taken affirmative action to fulfill the contract, U.S. Steel's
7%. See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530 (1933).
72. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Ry. v. Home Ins. Co., %83 Ind. 355, io8 N.E. 525 (1915); Cun-
ningham v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 139 N.C. 427, 51 S.E. %029 (1905).
73. Provided further, That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract
of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to which action the in-
sured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the
State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of any State by which the insurer has
been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
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citizenship will lie in the state or the states in which the branch or the branches
working on the contract are located. If the breach occurs before the contract is
transmitted to a branch or branches, or while it is in transit, the citizenship
will be in New York, the location of the control over the breach at that time.
The requirement of an affirmative act should avoid litigation over whether
the breach was caused by the branch or the home office. The plaintiff will at-
tempt to prove that the branch knew of the contract and its obligations there-
under and that it was in the process of complying; the corporation will attempt
to prove that the branch had not yet been notified and was not complying. The
dearest evidence would be of an affirmative act (i.e., notice of intent to deliver
or request for instructions) to fulfill this particular contract distinct from the
mill's daily operations. If the contract designates a specific mill to deliver from,
of course, the problem will be minimal. Further, the courts could prescribe rea-
sonable time limits before presuming that the designated branch was notified
of the contract and thus locating the breach in the state of the branch. A con-
tract calling for the participation of several branches would place corporate
citizenship in all the states concerned for purposes of litigation arising out of
that contract.
The proposal will apply equally well when the corporation is the plaintiff.
Even though the contract makes payment direct to the New York home office,
if delivery was to be made by the Utah mill and the customer wrongfully
refused delivery, the litigation arose out of corporate activity controlled in
Utah.
The proposed statute, giving corporations several places of business yet no
permanent citizenships, will achieve a greater reduction in diversity litigation
than does the 1958 amendment. Additionally, the anomaly, in whatever
form, of the corporation doing substantial local business using the federal
courts to the exclusion of other local corporations or citizens will be eradicated
as much as is conceptually possible. The proposal will, however, require pre-
mature offering of evidence relevant to substantive issues in contract cases to
determine jurisdiction. For example, the test, in some instances, will require
evidence relevant to responsibility for a breach to determine the location of
operating control over that breach. This burden should not be an intolerable
inconvenience since this evidence will be required for trial of the issues any-
way.
Further, the test abolishes the corporate charter as an indicia of citizenship;
concurrently, it abolishes all fictions concerning citizenship of stockholders.
This seems reasonable since the place of incorporation often has little relation
to the place of operations. Further, it has long been recognized that corpora-
tions, if they can choose where to incorporate, rest their decisions on reasons
other than doing business in the given state.74
In summary, the proposed test offers a comparatively simple standard that
74. Senate at 5.
not only will permit direct attention to the substantive issues, but also will
effectuate the congressional intent to constrict diversity jurisdiction and abolish
the anomaly of the local corporation being admitted to the federal courts mere-
ly because it has a foreign charter.
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